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Ar t i c l es
Since early 2009, Beijing has made numerous state-ments and published reassuring figures to boost talk ofa growth upturn round the corner. Despite such opti-
mistic talk, the economic crisis gripping China and the rest
of the world raises issues that have a bearing on the regime’s
own survival. While the Communist Party had hoped to
demonstrate the wisdom of the path it chose in 1979 to both
the developed world and to the former Soviet big brother,
questions have arisen regarding the regime’s ability to func-
tion efficiently in a time of stress.
It is 60 years since the Communists’ victory in 1949 against
the Kuomintang, which succumbed to its inability to pull
China out of a deeply inegalitarian stagnation. While the
conditions now are quite different, the Communist Party
could well face accusations of having likewise failed to come
up with the right remedies to the issues China has con-
fronted for more than 150 years.
In fact the crisis has hit China hard, serving as a reminder
that China remains a developing country buffeted by prob-
lems that had for long been masked by rapid growth. The
economic decoupling theory that once held sway has lost its
lustre, and the emphasis now is on realism and on finding so-
lutions that can restore to the regime the only real basis of
its internal and external legitimacy: its capacity to ensure
rapid growth backed by an extraordinary potential.
The crisis has already had social and political consequences
in China, and increasingly looks like a glitch in the system
that could derail and threaten a heretofore apparently irre-
sistible model of development and expansion.A  w or ri som e si tua tion
Although China was initially sheltered from the financial cri-
sis, it was hit hard when exports fell slowly at first in late
2008 and rapidly in early 2009. From minus 2.2 percent in
November and then minus 2.8 percent in December, the
downturn reached minus 14 percent in January, minus 26
percent in February, minus 17.1 percent in March, minus
22.6 percent in April and minus 26.4 percent in May. Con-
sequently, the trade surplus had fallen by 33 percent in May
compared to the previous year, in line with a trend that
began earlier in the year. China’s other growth engine, for-
eign direct investment, largely drawn from Taiwan, Hong
Kong, South Korea, and Japan – or the Cayman Islands –
also registered a steep fall of more than 20 percent over the
same period the previous year and the first quarter of 2009,
thus posing an even greater threat to China’s production and
success model, at least in the near term. (1)
In a concrete sign of the seizure affecting the economic ma-
chine, the index of production costs for manufactured goods
fell by 7.2 percent in May, and energy production fell by
10.4 percent, again continuing a trend begun in late 2008. (2)
The crisis has affected China’s most dynamic regions, where
much of the “China workshop” is based. These are labour-
intensive manufacturing industries, 30 percent of the produc-
tion of which is meant for export, the sector that has been
hit the hardest. (3)
Textiles, which accounted for half of China’s trade surplus,
were especially affected, as were the toy and shoe industries.
Concentration of production exacerbated the incidence of clo-
sures, often highly localised but with significant consequences
in terms of jobs lost. (4) In all, 670,000 firms have closed shop
since 2008, 62,400 of them in Guangdong alone, according
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This article considers whether China can emerge from the global economic crisis with its current policies vindicated
and its social order intact. Or will the Chinese development model fail to cope? Will the socio-economic situation and
the ever-present, deeply held fear of turmoil force Beijing to resort to whipping up nationalism and adopting an
aggressive economic and political stance abroad?
to provincial vice-governor Huang Longyun. (5)
The crisis has exposed the limits of a development model
based on the pursuit of low costs in terms of salaries, social
protection, and quality standards, which helped in exporting
massive quantities low-priced goods but did little for the
emergence of a domestic market. 
The fall in exports – should it be prolonged – has a bearing
on future growth in China, the leading beneficiary of global-
isation, on which it has now become highly dependant: Total
trade accounts for nearly 70 percent of China’s GDP, and
exports 38 percent. (6)
Growth forecasts for China are therefore pessimistic. The
growth rate has fallen from 13 percent in 2007 to 9 percent in
2008 and to a projected 6.7 percent, according to the IMF, in
2009. The first quarter of 2009 registered a mere 6.1 percent
growth despite the stimulus package adopted. China is thus
far from being able to act as the engine for a global recovery,
given that its imports are caving in from a negative growth of
46 percent in January to 24 percent in February, to 23 per-
cent in April, and to 25.2 percent in May 2009.
Aware of these difficulties, Chinese authorities sounded sev-
eral warnings during the National People’s Congress (NPC)
session in March, characterising the fall in exports – rather
euphemistically – as a source of serious difficulties. (7) Presi-
dent Hu Jintao solemnly declared that the two priorities for
2009 should be growth and social stability. (8)
S oc ial  co ns equ enc es
There are major social consequences of this crisis in what re-
mains a developing country, and which are especially worri-
some for the regime. The drop in exports and consequent
rise in unemployment directly affect the incomes of the poor-
est, including the rural poor, who have already witnessed
growing inequality with city dwellers. According to the Chi-
nese Academy of Social Sciences, the wealth gap between
the cities and the countryside in 2008 rose to 3.3, taking
into account incomes alone, and to 6 when the numerous so-
cial benefits city dwellers enjoy are included. (9) Since 2004,
rural incomes have risen on average by 6 percent annually, but
81N o  2 0 0 9 / 3
5. Wang Tao, “Asian Economic Perspective,” UBS Investment Research, 7 January 2009
and www.gov.cn.statecouncilpressconference/. 
6. By comparison, exports account for 26 percent of India’s GDP. The world average is 27
percent and the US figure is 11 percent. Source: World Bank. For China itself, this export
total accounted for only 9.7 percent of GDP in 1978 and 30.6 percent in 2000.
7. Xinhua, 10 March 2009.
8. Xinhua, 23 February 2009.
9. Shihui lanpi shu, 2009 nian Zhongguo shihui xingshi, (China Society Blue Book 2009),
Shihui kexue wenxian chubanshi, Beijing, 2009.
A Chinese shopper shows a voucher issued by Shanghai Yongan Department Store Co., Ltd. at the Yongan
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a major part of it is the money sent back by migrant workers. (10)
In 2007, the average annual rural income was put at 4,700
yuan, with non-farm work accounting for 40 percent. The more
than 20 percent fall in migrants’ incomes between June and
December 2008 has thus affected total rural income. (11)
More than 95 percent of migrant workers have no more than
secondary education and are mostly engaged in manufacturing
for export and in construction, both sectors suffering due to the
economic crisis. (12)
According to the National Bureau of Statistics, “peasant work-
ers” numbered 225 million at the end of 2008, and 140 mil-
lion of them, or 62 percent of the total, were employed in re-
gions other than their own. (13) With 26 million migrants esti-
mated to be unemployed as of early 2009, there are worrying
social consequences. (14)
Beyond these figures, the crisis starkly revealed the dysfunction
crippling China’s growth, which lacks real development but has
spawned new inequalities. These are regularly denounced but
have been ignored thanks to the prolonged growth. In fact,
while China has become the third economic power, overtaking
Germany since 2007, its per capita income was only $3,180 in
2008, placing it 104th in world rankings. (15)
More worrying than migrants, whose “patience” is often cited
by Chinese experts to warn of the risk of social explosion, are
students in whom parents have invested great hope and re-
sources and who are also affected by the crisis. Of the 5 mil-
lion who graduated in June 2008, as many as 1.6 million had
found no jobs by year end. By June 2009, 6.1 million new
graduates will have entered the job market. Reflecting the au-
thorities’ concern over the risks stemming from a mass of frus-
trated youth, Human Resources and Social Security Minister
Yin Weimin told the NPC in March 2009 that in view of the
serious jobs situation, priority would be accorded to employing
graduates.
While the crisis persists, affecting the whole Chinese model,
the middle class that has been the main beneficiary and bul-
wark of support for the regime has also been hit hard. Flagship
firms employing the country’s emerging white collar workers,
such as Lenovo and China Eastern, have suffered. Urban un-
employment, officially estimated at 4.2  percent and at 9.4
percent by CASS, is rising apace. (16)
Between  awa ren ess  an d c on tr ol  
There is thus real awareness of the crisis, despite official
statements claiming that China has the ability to recover and
that no major social problems loom. The leadership’s aim is
to reassure the population and the outside world in order to
gain the confidence that is crucial to China’s growth. At the
NPC session, Premier Wen Jiabao reaffirmed that despite
the IMF’s pessimistic forecasts, the 2009 growth rate would
be 8 percent. In April, he said the economy was doing bet-
ter than expected as shown by the – relatively – good indus-
trial production figures. (17)
At the same time, President Hu said for his part that the cri-
sis was a real test of the authorities’ ability to ensure good
“governance.” (18)
What is at stake is Chinese leaders’ ability to prove their
quasi-Confucian power to be “good leaders” as well as the
efficiency of the system over which they preside. The lead-
ership’s legitimacy essentially rests on economic growth,
which, despite being inequitable, has benefited all of China.
It is thus essential for the Chinese authorities to maintain at
least the appearance of success, in hopes that a global recov-
ery will help China resume its rapid growth path in 2010,
the sole short-term means of ensuring social harmony with-
out upsetting the system’s political bases.
But the crisis could also deepen the differences within the
Chinese leadership, as it contains mutually contradictory in-
terest groups, albeit linked by the common desire to sur-
vive. (19)
By revealing the dysfunction in the system and reducing
hopes for social progress, the crisis has further undermined
confidence in the political apparatus, more so at the local
level, where corruption, according to Chinese leaders’ own
denunciation, is rampant. A 2005 opinion poll of 500 stu-
dents in provincial-level Party schools showed that 62.3  per-
cent of them had confidence in the central authorities, but
the figure fell sharply to 30.3 percent for provincial officials,
14.9 percent for municipal officials, 8.9 percent for county
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China in the Face of Economic Crisis
(xian) level leaders, 5.6 percent for township (xiang) lead-
ers, and 3.7  percent for officials in towns (zhen). As per
Chinese figures, of the 4,000 “duties” collected in China,
the majority are levied by local authorities and 2,000 of
them are deemed illegal. (20)
This gathering debate is likely to spread from among the ex-
perts’ circle to that of politicians and to touch on the need
for and pace of political reform, although officially, state-
ments categorically rejecting any “Western-style“ reforms
have proliferated.
On 10 December 2008, a manifesto entitled Charter 08
(Lingba xianzhang) began circulating on the Internet despite
heavy censorship, calling for democratisation and the adop-
tion of genuine rule of law. More worrying for the authori-
ties who fear factionalism as a factor of vulnerability, the crit-
icism and attacks came also from the Party’s own albeit mar-
ginalised ranks, including people close to the deposed gen-
eral secretary Zhao Ziyang, such as Hu Qili and Bao Tong.
Debate choked off since the events of 1989 threatened to be
reactivated, stoking the fears of “chaos” ever present in the
collective subconscious of Chinese leaders — all the more so
given that none of the current leaders have the charisma
and, by some yardsticks, the legitimacy, of Mao Zedong or
Deng Xiaoping.
According to some sources that are difficult to verify but
whose information reflects openly voiced worries, President
Hu presented a “secret report” to the third plenum of the
16th Party Central Committee in October 2008, denouncing
the loss of idealism among the cadres, corruption and provin-
cialism, lack of a sense of common good, weakness of domes-
tic demand, unemployment, and public security tensions. (21)
Wu Jinglian, the former president of the State Council De-
velopment Research Centre, a leading light in China’s eco-
nomic reform and initiator of the socialist market economy
concept, added his voice to the call for pursuing reform and
modernisation in the political sphere, especially in the mat-
ter of the NPC’s budgetary supervision. (22)
There is much criticism of an irrational budget allocation sys-
tem, blamed in large part for the lack of development of the
domestic market. In education, despite recent efforts to cor-
rect the trend, the budget share remains 2.2 percent,
whereas in a comparable developing country such as India it
is more than 4 percent. Similarly, more than 70 percent of
rural residents have no access to even a minimal pension
fund, and a mere 15 percent of the entire population enjoys
some health insurance, the coverage of which is too limited
for it to be really significant. (23) Budgetary allocation for
health accounts for barely 1 percent of GDP, according to
World Health Organisation figures (which rank China
156th among 196 countries), and drain away a high level of
household savings.
Conversely, the allocation for administration, the Party’s
main support base consisting of officials and “cadres,” takes
up 25 percent of the budget. Public works, another source
of influence-peddling, takes up more than 30 percent. (24)
The stimulus plan envisages strengthening social security,
but Chinese experts point out that the part of the package
earmarked for social security is extremely insufficient and
could lead to an increase of no more than 0.3 percent of the
share of the budget allocated to social security. (25)
Political reform, as well as the adoption of a social safety net,
presents almost insurmountable challenges for a system
whose limits have been exposed by the crisis that has now
gripped China — the more so as doubts about the Chinese
model and the slowdown in exports sparked by scandalous
quality control failures had already begun rearing their heads
in late 2007, the crisis having merely sped up the process. (26)A  s tim ulus p la n of  dubi ous e f f ica cy
Noting the seriousness of the crisis, Beijing announced in
2008 a $586 billion stimulus plan making up 6 percent of
GDP and spread over two years. It has two aims: Domesti-
cally, in addition to inducing recovery, it seeks to correct
weaknesses incurred from the crisis and attempts to achieve
balanced growth. Externally it aims to show that China is a
great power with the will and the means to act as meaning-
fully as other major international actors. The stimulus plan
helped China take its place among the G20 Summit of
major economies.
The plan envisages infrastructural development, recovery of
the construction sector hit hard by the bursting of the eco-
nomic bubble, strengthening the rural infrastructure, and a
boost to social sector investments. It seeks to increase job-
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creating projects and help create a “domestic market” to re-
place the external markets severely hurt by the crisis. House-
hold consumption in China accounts for a mere 30 percent
of GDP, down from more than 50 percent in the 1980s. 
Reba lan c in g gr owth  to  develop  th e  domes tic  ma rket
Thus, officially the stimulus plan seeks to ensure the stability
and growth of the domestic market by boosting demand
through the rebuilding of the now tattered social safety net-
work. The aim is to double the 2008 average rural income by
2020 through several projects, including land development.
The Party plenum in October 2008, held just as the effects
of the crisis began to be felt, was devoted to rural reforms,
but with limited concrete developments, as the issue of prop-
erty rights had yet to be settled. Quite apart from unequal
development, the rural land use system is at the centre of
more than 65 percent of mass incidents of unrest. (27) At the
same time, the system helps enrich local authorities and
serves the Party’s short-term goal of consolidating its net-
work by allowing local cadres to benefit.
Moreover, the declared ambition for balanced growth is
hardly new and confronts a system in which desire for reform
is limited by fear of instability. Thus, in the wake of the 1997
Asian financial crisis, the Central Committee working group
on the economy had decided on the need to refocus China’s
development model on more sustained growth right from
December 1998. But then as now, short-term imperatives
prevailed over more complex long-term strategies in the in-
terests of limiting risk for the regime. (28)
Sti mul atin g c r ed it  an d  c on s u mp tion
As part of the economic stimulus, the central bank also put
out directives to encourage credit for small and medium-
sized enterprises, traditional recipients of state support that
account for 80 percent of the job market. (29) Measures were
also adopted to ease credit to encourage the creation of in-
dividual enterprises in rural areas.
In January 2009, however, 90 percent of the credit disbursed
by banks as part of the stimulus plan went to state firms, and
of the ten industrial projects identified as priority cases, eight
involved state firms. (30) The same situation prevailed in the
disbursement of $54 billion for innovation and restructuring
presented to the NPC as part of the stimulus package. (31)
Direct aid was put in place to artificially and quickly stimu-
late the domestic market. In the countryside, subsidies of up
to 13 percent of product price were extended for the pur-
chase of consumer goods such as televisions, refrigerators,
mobile phones, washing machines, and automobiles, whereas
such aid had traditionally gone to farm produce. (32) Vouchers
of 22 yuan in cities and 14 yuan in the countryside were also
distributed with a view to boosting consumption. 
Limits  of  th e s t imu lu s  pla n
Right from early 2009, the Chinese authorities have
claimed positive results from the stimulus plan, but many
doubts remain regarding its reach and long-term effective-
ness. Apart from the amount, the issue of financing has been
raised, and contradicting official statements, some analysts
say the real level of central government debt has already
reached 50 percent of GDP. The central authorities‘ share
would in reality be limited to a quarter of the projected $586
billion, at least half of the remainder coming from local au-
thorities and banks. (33) In the first quarter of 2009, the
amount of new credit allocated increased rapidly, but the ac-
tual total is difficult to calculate. The aim was to boost pro-
duction and overall growth, but that could prove short-
sighted should internal and external consumption fail to re-
gain dynamism. By mid-2009, hopes of a rapid recovery as
well as the veracity of statistics appeared open to question.
Also at issue was the choice of infrastructure projects
funded by the stimulus plan. Thanks to a decision-making
system that is difficult to overhaul in the short term, the au-
thorities are heavily reliant on major state firms — who are
the primary recipients of credit, notably through the Party’s
links at all levels — as well as on public enterprises and
banks.
Other major risks include corruption, despite frequent calls
by the central authorities for strict control over the use of
funds, and the financing of economically unviable state firms
at the provincial or municipal levels. (34)
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China in the Face of Economic Crisis
If the stimulus plan does produce results adequate to forestall
a major fall in the 2009 growth rate, the positive effect on jobs
and domestic consumption would seem to be less certain.
S h or t-ter m ent icemen t an d s u ppo rt  tob oos t  expo rts
Facing a rapid fall in exports, Chinese authorities took steps
right from late 2008 to encourage manufacturing and exports
in the short term. In December, Minister of Industry and In-
formation Technology Li Yizhang said China would use all
possible tariff systems to facilitate exports in labour-intensive
sectors. (35) Ten key sectors were chosen: textiles, light indus-
try, electronics, automobiles – sales of which had fallen by
14 percent in January 2009 only to rebound by 25 percent
in March – shipbuilding, machine tools, steel, non-ferrous
metals, and petrochemicals. (36) Commerce Minister Chen
Deming told the NPC that a number of steps would be
taken to bolster exports through taxes and development of
credit. (37)T he  a uthor it ie s  fa ce  l im its  tot he Chine se  m ode l
The crisis has heightened both the expectations of and the
lack of confidence in the authorities and the system’s function-
ing. A weakened leadership may be tempted to take recourse
in nationalism or fall back on ideology to deal with rising dis-
sent. There is a real risk of endemic social unrest, which could
proliferate and become less controllable if the crisis persists,
and of fractures along regional and provincial lines. (38)
D evelo pmen t of  c on tr ol  c apa ci ty
Aware of the risk of internal disorder, the leadership has
sought to adopt a strategy aimed at defusing discontent and
keeping order. In January 2009, the Party’s Central Commis-
sion for Discipline Inspection held a plenary session that
called for better conduct on the part of cadres and urged spe-
cial attention to people’s needs and suggestions for resolving
social problems. (39) By mid-2009, high-ranking officials in
Guangdong and Tianjin had been arrested for corruption.
At the same time, public security authorities were mobilised,
and the People’s Armed Police, the poor cousin of the power-
ful People’s Liberation Army, received a 32.6 percent budget
increase in 2009, taking the outlay to 116 billion yuan. (40)
Even so, the gathering uncertainties stoke deeply held fears
of “internal disorder” and can unleash nationalist tendencies
that have a bearing on Beijing’s external strategy, even if the
authorities prefer to limit the use of such tendencies for do-
mestic purposes.
N ati on ali st  temp tatio n s
A book published in the spring of 2009 expounded on the
theme of China’s humiliation by Western powers in blocking
its rise, and on the need for Beijing to impose its own norms
on the international arena. Quite apart from the publicity
that greeted the book, China’s readiness to defend its inter-
ests and challenge the international order dominated by the
“West” has been evident in the demands it has made on is-
sues such as finance during the G20 Summit or on the en-
vironment in the run-up to the Copenhagen climate confer-
ence in December 2009. (41)
On Internet websites, some form of implicit or passive en-
couragement is being given to nationalistic blogs, despite the
difficulty of keeping the rhetoric under control. There is a
genuine tendency to divert popular discontent, especially
that of some educated urban youths towards foreign scape-
goats, as witnessed, for instance, during the rupture with
Paris until at least mid-2009. Thus “public opinion” has be-
come a useful tool – perhaps manipulated – for the Chinese
authorities in their dealings with the rest of the world.
More worryingly, this temptation toward nationalism can
take the form of military gestures with serious consequences.
This has been the case with Japan in the East China Sea,
where clashes occurred in the autumn of 2008 despite coop-
eration accords signed in June the same year. It has also
been evident in the South China Sea, with several naval in-
cidents with the United States, and the tone raised against
littoral states such as the Philippines despite agreements
signed with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
This strategy weighs against the perception of China as a re-
sponsible actor on the international scene. (42)
Finally, nationalism has reared its head in economic rela-
tions – though China is hardly alone in this respect – thus
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undermining the hopes raised by Beijing’s theoretical inte-
gration into the global system through WTO accession. (43)
In time, the economic crisis could also have a bearing on
China’s action on the international scene, even if the crisis
provides an opportunity for bolstering Beijing’s influence in
strategic sectors such as energy and raw materials. This may
especially prove true in China’s role in Africa and its stand
on environment.
“B eij i n g  co ns en su s ” l ess  attr ac tive  f orAfr ic a?
In Africa, where Beijing stands in clear opposition to the
Western model by advancing the “efficiency” of its action as
against “interference” from the West, the Chinese model
could yet be questioned should the crisis persist. The fall in
China’s growth rate has already affected the price of raw ma-
terials and oil (which to a great extent had fuelled the con-
tinent’s growth) in recent years on the order of 5 percent.
The development aid China has been granting African
countries for a number of years could be reconsidered if
growth continues to slow. Despite repeated official state-
ments that China would not abandon Africa, domestic pub-
lic hostility expressed freely via the Internet could weigh on
the authorities’ decisions.
In the case of Guinea, China is now hesitating to invest in
infrastructural development, officially due to the risk of polit-
ical instability, but also because the collapse of raw material
prices has weakened Chinese firms’ interest in African in-
vestments. Similarly, an agreed $9 billion in aid to the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo, meant for infrastructural develop-
ment facilitating access to mineral reserves, now seems
threatened. (44)
Th e en vir on ment i ss u e
Similar questions linked to a reduction of resources and an
overhaul of priorities weigh on the issues of environment and
sustainable development. While Beijing created a “super
ministry” of environment under pressure from abroad in
2008, resources have not been forthcoming, and questions
have arisen over the authorities’ ability to impose a long-term
strategy on all levels of decision-making. 
Thus, the economic crisis might have provided welcome jus-
tification to the authorities, who have stepped up warnings
in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit of the impossibil-
ity for China to impose greater curbs at a time of crisis.
Within China, new technologies and renewable energy
could open up opportunities, with some analysts noting that
the domestic automobile industry could turn out electric ve-
hicles “within ten years” and thus assert Chinese might in
the face of older industrial powers. (45)
On the other hand, however, social pressures and the risks
of unemployment do not favour a real challenge to the su-
premacy of polluting industries and coal. The support pro-
posed by the authorities gives prominence to the most en-
ergy-hungry and polluting industries. In the current Chinese
system, the pressure of ensuring growth and the fear of un-
employment, especially at the local level, can only militate
against any measure that could lead to a slowdown – how-
ever beneficial to the environment – and act as a break on
exports through the imposition of new duties or rules or the
shuttering of polluting industries. (46)Concl usion
According to a statement from Beijing, the crisis might give
China an opportunity to impose the reforms widely deemed
necessary to consolidate the regime and defend the Chinese
model. Similarly in the international arena, some analysts in
Beijing say the crisis could lead to a major shift of the global
balance of power in Beijing’s favour.
At the same time, the Chinese economy’s heavy reliance on
foreign trade and globalisation has been exposed as the
Achilles’ heel of a leadership that is at pains to impose itself
and the measures it advocates to deal with the situation.
Further, the question remains whether the crisis will make
Beijing more receptive to calls from abroad while the main-
tenance of stability, growth, and domestic order remain the
regime’s priorities, or whether it perceives threats to its sur-
vival and chooses to “export” its way out, both economically
and politically, through recourse to nationalism and denunci-
ation of foreign enemies as a means of controlling “internal
disorder.” These doubtless are the two temptations Beijing’s
top leadership faces today.•
• Translated by N. Jayaram
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